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F
rans de Waal’s laboratory 
monkeys won’t work for unequal 
pay. If a partner monkey gets 
a grape (big bucks) for little or no 
work (trading a token), a monkey will 
reject her measly cucumber pay from 
her human “boss.” And she makes her 
disdain known, hurling her cucumber 
or token out of her cubicle—even 
though she would happily gobble down 
cucumbers in other circumstances.
De Waal’s work at the Yerkes Primate 
Center at Emory University in Atlanta 
has shown an aversion to inequality 
in non-human primates (Figure 1), 
drawing an evolutionary link between 
how humans and monkeys make 
decisions. Humans reject inequality, 
too, even if it means walking away 
empty-handed. This behavior cannot be 
explained by classical economic theory 
that says both monkeys and humans 
should take whatever reward they are 
offered to maximize gain. But in species 
like de Waal’s monkeys and humans 
that rely heavily on cooperation 
for survival, evolution has favored 
a complex calculus for even simple 
decisions. 
In a simplified way, de Waal’s 
experiments and others blend 
neurobiologists’ ability to track 
behavior and brain processes with 
economists’ models of the cost–benefit 
analyses behind every decision made 
by an animal. The two fields have 
each been working toward explaining 
decision-making behavior, using widely 
different approaches for decades. 
Recently, researchers in both fields 
have recognized that using tools from 
the other trade might speed their own 
work along, resulting in the emerging 
field of neuroeconomics.
Teaming Up
The principle of Expected Utility says 
that a person facing uncertainty will 
rank the possible payoffs or outcomes 
as a function of their expected values 
and probabilities of happening. Using 
this principle, experimental economists 
tested the idea that humans should 
interact with a self-interest that gives the 
highest possible gain. In the Ultimatum 
game, one person is given a sum of 
money and must decide how much of 
that sum to share with a second person. 
The second person can then decide to 
accept or reject the offer, but the catch 
is that if he rejects the offer, neither 
player gets any money. 
Although rational-decision theory 
predicts that the first player should 
make a low offer and the second 
player should accept because it would 
maximize how much each player leaves 
with, the results were resoundingly 
irrational. Most first players offered 
close to half of the money and most 
second players rejected sums lower than 
half. Economists were stumped when 
their models fell far short of explaining 
human decision-making.
“Standard economic theory uses 
models where players are calculating 
complicated numbers, thinking far 
ahead to figure out what the other 
person will do, and there are no 
temptations,” explains Colin Camerer, 
a behavioral economist at the 
California Institute of Technology in 
Pasadena. Those models tended to be 
mathematically simple, but realistically 
hard on the players, he says. “People 
aren’t that smart. An 18-year-old 
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doesn’t plan out his entire lifetime 
savings.”
Camerer has teamed up with 
neurobiologists looking at brain 
scans of people while they play games 
like Ultimatum. The results of such 
experiments should reveal new 
mechanisms at play in the brain during 
decisions, like aversion to inequality, 
that economists can add to their models 
to reflect the sophistication of human 
choices more accurately.
On the other side of the 
decision-making fence, 
neurobiologists in the last 
decade had begun to look 
beyond mapping how the 
brain processed sensory input 
or motor output and began 
asking questions about what 
was happening in between 
those two systems. Once they 
turned away from simple 
experiments in which a single 
stimulus elicits a uniform 
response, giving meaning to 
neural activity was no longer 
easy. For example, Paul 
Glimcher and his colleagues 
at New York University in 
New York City gave monkeys 
a visual cue indicating that 
a gaze shift either to the left 
or right would result in some 
level of juice reward. All things 
being equal, monkeys had no 
reason to favor one side or 
the other. However, when the 
experimenters increased the 
amount of juice reward for 
one side on random trials, the 
same visual cue now elicited 
a very different pattern of 
movement, favoring that 
side. And the neural activity 
they recorded appeared to reflect the 
monkeys’ sense of how they could get 
the most reward, rather than any clear 
association with sensation or action.
To account for these results, 
Glimcher and others turned to 
economic models of decision-making 
that took into account the probability 
of a reward, the size or value of the 
reward, and the cost of work to get 
the reward. These variables, the 
neuroscientists hypothesized, might lie 
between environmental stimulus and 
action and be the link between sensory 
neurons and motor neurons in the 
brain.
“We know that to make efficient 
decisions, you have to know 
the utility of the decision,” says 
Glimcher. “Economists had beautiful 
computational models to describe all 
of these processes” used to calculate 
utility. Now, he says, the next step is to 
look for these variables in the brain at a 
cellular level.
Cell Decisions
One laboratory has shown that 
neurons can indeed “code” for some 
of the variables weighed during simple 
decisions or choices. Wolfram Schultz 
and his colleagues at Cambridge 
University in the United Kingdom 
studied dopamine-releasing neurons 
in the ventral midbrain of monkeys. 
Dopamine neurons have long been 
implicated in reward-seeking behavior 
and are targets of highly addictive drugs 
like nicotine and cocaine.
In their experiment, monkeys 
responded to five distinct visual stimuli 
that matched the probability of the 
juice reward. Each cue represented 
either a probability of 0 (no reward), 
0.25, 0.50, 0.75, or 1 (certain reward). 
Because uncertainty and probability are 
inherently linked—that is, uncertainty 
is highest at a probability of 0.50 and 
lowest at 0 and 1—the researchers 
could then look for neuronal responses 
to both variables.
What they found were two distinct 
ways in which the same dopamine 
neurons code for probability and 
uncertainty. With decreasing 
probability of reward, the monkey’s 
dopamine neurons fired stronger bursts 
at the time of the reward delivery. At 
the same time, with greater uncertainty 
of reward, a sustained increase 
in activity occurred between 
the flashing of the visual cue 
and the reward delivery. In 
other words, this intervening 
activity was not seen when 
the probability equaled 0 or 
1 and was greatest when the 
probability of getting a reward 
was 50/50, the highest level of 
uncertainty.
“To make decisions about 
rewards or money, a person has 
to make predictions about the 
future, and in any prediction 
there is some uncertainty that 
is critical,” says Christopher 
Fiorillo, a neurophysiologist in 
Schultz’ lab who led the study. 
“This is the first demonstration 
of a single neuron coding 
uncertainty.” Fiorillo says there 
are probably many other types 
of neurons in the brain that 
can code uncertainty, but the 
fact that dopamine neurons do 
it adds another intriguing layer 
to decision-making behavior.
Dopamine neurons, he 
explains, have been shown to 
have a reinforcing effect, so 
that an animal will seek out 
stimuli or actions that are 
followed by a release of dopamine. So, 
Fiorillo says, he was surprised to see the 
activity of dopamine neurons increased 
by uncertainty about a reward, as if 
uncertainty itself were rewarding in 
some way. The finding might help 
explain why people are drawn to 
gambling even though they tend to 
lose money on average. Fiorillo and his 
colleagues speculate that outside the 
artificial conditions of a laboratory or a 
casino, an uncertain situation presents 
a learning opportunity that may help 
the decision-makers “beat the odds” the 
next time they face it. And so evolution 
would favor paying attention to highly 
uncertain scenarios. 
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Figure 1. Capuchin Monkeys Sharing 
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In another experiment, Glimcher 
and colleagues had monkeys play a 
“game” in which there were two ways of 
getting juice, with each choice having 
a different probability of reward. 
After 100 trials, the probabilities were 
changed. 
“Basically, he’s playing a two-armed 
slot machine whose payoff rates are 
constantly switched on him,” says 
Glimcher. “His behavior looks pretty 
erratic, but he’s getting it about right. 
He spends two-thirds more time on 
the one that is two-thirds more likely 
to give him juice.” And, he says, 
an economic model of this choice 
predicts the monkey’s behavior with 
90% accuracy. This might indicate 
that, subconsciously, humans tally 
probabilities, expected gain, and the 
cost of the work to get the reward in all 
manner of simple choice decisions. At 
the level of neurons, we might all be 
math-whizzes.
But game-theory work has shown that 
humans rarely think ahead in complex 
interactions far enough to arrive at the 
most rewarding decision. Glimcher, by 
applying the principles of the utility 
decision theory of maximal gain, has 
found neurons that may code the 
variables that go into such a decision. 
But, others say, since humans do not 
always act in a way that maximizes their 
gain, other computational models may 
give a better answer to how we make 
decisions in more complex contexts.
“The difference is a question 
of perspective, since we’re really 
all interested in the same issues,” 
says Joshua Gold, a neuroscientist 
at University of Pennsylvania in 
Philadelphia. He and his collaborators 
have used a mathematical framework 
called Banburismus to model decision-
making in monkeys performing a 
difficult visual task. 
British codebreakers used 
Banburismus in World War II to 
break the German navy’s Enigma 
code (Figure 2). It consists of three 
components: a method to quantify the 
weight of evidence, a method to update 
this quantity with additional evidence, 
and a decision rule that determines 
when there is enough evidence to make 
a decision. Gold and his colleagues 
apply the framework to monkeys  
watching a cluster of dots moving across 
a screen of randomly moving dots.  The 
monkeys earn juice by shifting their 
gaze in the same direction as the dot 
cluster. By increasing the number of 
randomly moving background dots, 
they can push the monkeys’ visual 
system to its limits. 
It is at this point, Gold says, that 
other factors besides visual cues come 
into play as the monkey decides how 
to answer. “By getting the monkey to 
work in a regime where he’s coming 
close to guessing, then we see much 
more influence by extraneous factors 
such as bias [i.e., the monkey’s previous 
experiences] and size of reward,” 
says Gold. The computational model 
gives a way to represent these factors 
mathematically and can also predict the 
error rates and reaction times of the 
monkeys’ decisions.
“If it really does explain behavior 
mathematically,” adds Gold, “it will 
be a nice way of studying how those 
variables predict behavior.” These 
models, whether based in economic 
decision theory or statistics like 
Banburismus, give physiologists good 
candidates in their search for decision-
making functions in neuronal circuits. 
Neurobiologists chasing the perfect 
model that can incorporate all the 
factors that go into a decision say it will 
show how humans calculate the mental 
“currency” that allows us to literally 
compare apples to oranges and decide 
which to buy.
 Some biologists, however, are 
cautious about translating what 
happens in an economics-based 
neurobiology experiment in the lab to 
more complicated human behavior in 
business or courtroom decisions. “We 
don’t want to say things that are wrong, 
incomplete, or could be miscontrued,” 
says Jeff Schall,  a vision researcher 
at Vanderbilt University in Nashville, 
Tennessee. “And we don’t need to, to 
make scientific progress.”
His lab has found two sets of neurons 
in the anterior cingulate cortex that 
respond when a monkey shifts his 
gaze to a target—those that signal 
success and those that signal mistakes. 
He has also recorded similar signals 
from electrodes placed on humans 
performing the same task. These signals 
can be thought of as the “oops” or 
“high-five” feeling that tells an animal 
how to proceed in the next trial. Both 
humans and monkeys slow down on 
the next trial after an “oops” signal. 
Schall says his work shows another 
aspect of decision-making, adaptation, 
not accounted for in classical economic 
views of reward influences.
“Neuroeconomics is just part of the 
bigger picture of goal-directed action,” 
he says. Others say economic theories 
lack another critical component—how 
to calculate how much value the reward 
has to the decision-maker.
“There’s a lot of emphasis on 
game theory and it’s very exciting, 
but there’s one flaw that everyone 
recognizes,” says Barry Richmond, a 
systems neuroscientist at the National 
Institute of Mental Health in Bethesda, 
Maryland. “How do you measure 
value at any given moment when it is 
changing both because of personal 
situation and because of external 
things?” Richmond sees that monkeys, 
like humans, exhibit different levels of 
aversiveness to work. 
Richmond’s monkeys have been 
trained to learn a visual cue, a 
brightness bar, that indicates how much 
work is left before getting the reward. 
As the reward gets closer, its “value” 
appears to go up, because the monkeys 
work harder (by making fewer errors) 
in the last trials before the reward. 
DOI: 10.1371/journal/pbio.0000077.g002
Figure 2. Enigma Machine 
Alan Turing and colleagues at Bletchley 
Park broke the German Navy’s 
unbreakable Enigma code with the help 
of a mathematical framework they called 
“Banburismus.”  Some neuroscientists 
think this framework could also help 
to break the neural code.  (Image 
modified from the National Cryptologic 
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Obviously, value pivots on the timing 
of the reward, among many other 
considerations. 
It is easy to see a little bit of ourselves 
in this monkey business. Students study 
furiously the night before an exam to 
be rewarded with a grade. As a project 
deadline looms, employees put in 
longer hours in order to keep their job. 
But some experimentalists have gone 
even further in making connections 
between neurons firing in a monkey’s 
brain and what’s going on in ours.
Let Me Pick Your Brain
Kevin McCabe, a neuroeconomist 
at George Mason University in Fairfax, 
Virginia, was among the first social 
scientists to set up a neurobiology 
experiment to answer his questions 
about how humans make decisions. His 
early work showed that if you changed 
the Ultimatum Game into the Dictator 
Game, where the first person simply 
dictated how much the second person 
got, then humans still gave a fairly 
large sum away, about one-third of the 
total. Only when the experimenter and 
the second person could not see the 
decision of the dictator did the dictator 
begin acting in the rational, self-serving 
manner of giving away tiny amounts. 
Only in the socially isolated context did 
the dictator follow economic principles.
“We wanted to design an imaging 
experiment to demonstrate that when 
people reciprocate, brain processing 
is different than when they are not 
cooperating,” says McCabe. The 
subsequent experiment, where people 
played the Ultimatum Game inside 
a scanner that takes a functional 
magnetic resonance image (fMRI), 
showed that blood flow and, by proxy, 
neuronal activation increased in the 
frontal brain areas of cooperators. 
These areas included human homologs 
of the lateral intraparietal area that 
Glimcher had seen activated by reward 
size and probability and the anterior 
cingulate cortex that Schall found 
to send success or failure messages 
(Figure 3).
McCabe’s experiment hints that 
humans are wired to cooperate. “We’re 
biologically endowed to engage in 
personal exchange,” he says. “And 
what makes economies run so well is 
not personal exchange per se, but our 
ability to trade with people we don’t 
even know—to buy food at the grocery 
store from a farmer we’ve never met.”
Another group, led by Read 
Montague, director of the Human 
Neuroimaging Laboratory at Baylor 
College of Medicine in Houston, Texas, 
has also looked at brains of cooperators 
in the Trust Game. Here, an investor 
decides to trust a trustee with some of 
her money. The investment is increased 
by the experimenter and then the 
trustee decides how much to give back 
to the investor. This game is played 
out ten times by two people who meet 
each other at the beginning and whose 
brains are scanned simultaneously as 
they play.
The researchers wanted to see what 
happens in each player’s brain when 
the trustee’s decision is revealed to both 
on a computer screen. “The trustee’s 
brain shows the visual cortical activity 
only of seeing the screen,” Montague 
explains. “But the investor’s brain 
goes haywire, with both emotional and 
cognitive reactions to what they see.” 
Presumably, the activity represents 
the investor trying to assimilate the 
information into her decision of how 
much to invest in the next round.
Montague, a physicist by 
training, says he’s found a home 
in the computational nature of 
neuroeconomics, which adds a “fresh 
look at a bunch of problems that 
were previously only at the margins 
of behavioral psychology.” But he 
also sees the advantages that the field 
brings to economists by shoring up 
their models with physical evidence: 
“Let’s face it, they don’t have good 
models now or they could tell you 
what’s going to happen [in the stock 
market] tomorrow. This is starting to 
give economists a way to loop back into 
experiments—they realized they’ve got 
to crack the head open.”
Montague’s collaborator Camerer 
agrees that knowing how individual 
humans make decisions could certainly 
improve our understanding of larger 
markets. After all, global trade 
institutions are still run by individuals 
who draw on their own ability to trade 
and make decisions. Unraveling the 
decision-making code would open 
windows on economic questions 
ranging from the global (Why do 
certain countries enjoy economic 
growth?) to the very personal (What 
causes compulsive behavior when 
reward systems go bad?).
Camerer sees neuroeconomics as 
trying to “make a one-to-one mapping 
from economic theory to the brain. 
We have a head start, but it’s very 
difficult to produce clear neuroscience 
that also has economic significance.” 
In just a few decades, he envisions 
that economic theory may look very 
different, perhaps throwing out utility 
altogether and instead having a system 
of mechanisms found in the brain 
that interact to help a shopper decide, 
“What’s for dinner?”
And the knowledge coming out of 
the fledgling field—how the brain 
codes motivation and reward value—
could be used to increase work output, 
promote more effective addictive 
drug rehab programs, and stabilize 
economies. Camerer adds, “This work 
can really go from synapses seen in 
brain imaging to explaining the most 
important thing in the world—why is 
Africa poor and Singapore rich?” 
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Figure 3. Rewarding the Brain 
The ventral midbrain is active when 
humans receive an unpredictable juice 
reward.   Monetary rewards, although 
defined by cultural agreement, also 
engage the same subcortical reward 
processing structures. (fMRI image 
courtesy of P. Read Montague.)